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Security Commissioner, Engineers Australia:
Bruce Howard, bhoward@engineersaustralia.org.au

Editor
: Athol Yates, tel 0402 419 583, Athol.Yates@safeguardingaustralia.org.au


Events

Building and integrating large scale CCTV for security and counter-terrorism
Canberra 24 February 05
Information

www.homelandsecurity.org.au/events

31 May 2005

  1. Brief news from around Australia
  2. Major security address
  3. 2005-06 Federal Budget
  4. Australia's offshore oil and gas facilities require to produce security plans
  5. Details of the maritime industry identification card released
  6. New Review of Aviation Security in Australia
  7. New Centre of Expertise established in Defence Autonomous Vehicle Systems
  8. Major investment in special forces capability

1 Brief news from around Australia

  1. The current Director-General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), Dennis Richardson, is to succeed Michael Thawley as the next Australian Ambassador to the United States.
  2. The Defence Minister has announced that in August this year, a Regional Counter Terrorism Subject Matter Expert Exchange will be held in Perth. It will bring together both the command and tactical level special forces experts and provide the opportunity to demonstrate methods and procedures employed by their counter-terrorism units. Australia will also be participating in the second Regional Special Forces Counter-Terrorism Conference, attended by Special Forces commanders and senior counter-terrorism policy officers from many Asia Pacific nation, in Singapore later this year.
  3. Tenix Defence has presented two of ten new armoured cars to the Attorney-General, under the auspices of a two-year, $3.9m contract set for completion by October. The ten limousines, based on the Holden 'Caprice' luxury limousine, have been modified by Tenix Defence's Land Division (Wingfield, SA) under a teaming arrangement with Holden and Craig International Ballistics. Tenix Defence fits the protective armour and carries out engineering modifications to ensure the vehicles comply with Australian Design Rules. The company has also developed a special maintenance schedule for the vehicles, and will provide support for their life-of-type.
  4. The latest National Security Practice Note has been published by the Australian Homeland Security Research Centre. It answers the question "Who should pay for security enhancements?" It presents a defensible and equitable process for sharing security costs and benefits between industry/critical infrastructure and the community. It moves beyond the rhetorical flourish that "security is a cost of doing business". This is because some costs are, and some aren't. Those that aren't need to be shared between all stakeholders. It is available from here.

2 Major security address

The Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, has given a major address on how the government perceives the evolving global terrorist threat. It updates the Government's position as detailed in last year's White Paper on terrorism- Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia.

The address was given on the 18 May at Perth's Murdoch University. Below are several extracts.

Extremists are engaged in a global jihad against all who do not commit to their particular interpretation of Islam. Their reach is global. Their jihad is an insurgency or a series of insurgencies that seeks to change the status quo through violence. Terrorism is one component of the extremist's broader struggle that includes propaganda, education, the transnational flow of capital etc. Their aim is a pan-Islamic caliphate, where moderate Islamic leaders and nations are seen as opponents as much as the countries of the West.

The War on Terrorism has significantly degraded the broader al Qaida network and leadership and limited their current operational capacity, but they are patient, persistent and adaptive. They do not seek to reach their goals in months or years but are prepared to take decades to achieve their aims of a transformed Islamic world.

We understand that the global jihad functions through regional 'theatres of operation' where groups cooperate and support each other across countries and regions. We believe that within theatres, groups conform to al Qaida's ideology and strategy, and share common operational approaches. They have learned that a form of 'unrestricted warfare,' gives them the opportunity to take on the might of the United States and its allies - circumventing the unparalleled conventional military force of the US with terror. Importantly, traditional methods of deterrence will not work against a committed enemy with no traditional state to protect, nor concerns for personal safety. Islamic extremists have gained a strategic advantage by striking at the vulnerabilities of our tolerant and open societies.

The decentralised network that characterises al Qaida and related groups gives these groups a capacity to operate beyond traditional leadership structures. Coalition operation in Afghanistan for instance certainly contributed to the degradation of al Qaida's capacity, but within these terrorist networks the capture of key members like Khalid Sheikh Mohammad is not enough to eliminate the threat entirely. We believe that while al Qaida's aims remain the same, they are in a process of reconstitution. Their focus will be those areas where they can do the most harm, and do the most to further their ideological aims, specifically in Iraq, which in the words of CIA Director Porter Goss, while "not a cause of extremism, has become a cause for extremists".

The full speech is available here.

3 2005-06 Federal Budget
In the first Australian Government Budget after the 11 September 2001 attacks, all the national security initiatives were bundled under the banner of the A Safer Australia package. Then came Investing in Australia's Security and this year we have the Providing for Australia's Security package. This continued bringing together all of the initiatives under one label is more than a marketing gimmick - it reflects the importance that the Australian Government has given to enhancing the nation's security.

This importance is reflected in the increasing level of spending on national security since 2001. The cumulative investment is now over $5 billion over the eight years from 2001-02.

The 2005-06 security initiatives, valued at $1.1 billion over four years, are the largest single Budget increase since 2002/03. The size of the increase is not surprising as it reflects the conversion of plans that have been developed into reality over the last few years. An example of this is the Government Continuity Plan. For several years, such a plan has been under development but progress has been slow as it was funded from internal sources. The planning has led to the initiative seen in the Budget today which involves spending some $12.1 million (including $5.1 million in capital funding) over four years to implement and maintain the Plan.

The 2005-06 Budget expenditure can be grouped into the areas of:

Intelligence Capabilities: A total of $239 million has been provided to strengthen intelligence capabilities and to fund counter-terrorism investigations. Significant projects include:
* Enhancing ASIO's analytical and technical capabilities for counter-terrorism investigations ($48 million)
* Enhancing the counter-proliferation intelligence of ASIS, ASIO and Defence Intelligence Group ($43 million)
* Enhancing the language capabilities of ASIO ($3 million)
* Enhancing Defence Intelligence Group's intelligence coordination and analysis because of the increased operational demands ($13 million)
* Upgrading Defence's information systems ($5 million)

Incident Response: Over $26 million will be spent on enhancing Australia's incident response capability, which includes implementing and maintaining a Continuity of Government Plan ($12 million) and providing increased resources for counter-terrorism prosecutions.

Protective Security: Over $521 million has been committed to protective security upgrades. Major elements include:
* Increasing diplomatic protection and the protection of high office holders ($120 million)
* Developing the surge capacity of the AFP ($22 million)
* Establishing ASIO's Business Liaison Unit ($3 million)
* Providing surveillance of the North-West Shelf by Defence ($139 million)
* Improving security at Australia's overseas missions by enhancing emergency communication systems, installing new security detection systems and relocating some missions

Border Security Traveller Technology: A total of $226.3 million has been committed for technology enhancements to improve control over who arrives and leaves Australia, and to verify travellers' identities quickly and reliably. Specific projects the money will be spent on include:
* deploying biometric technology
* utilising face and fingerprint scans
* the introduction of ePassports for Australian citizens
In addition there will be enhancements to the Government's movement alert list.

Regional Cooperation: The Budget provides an additional $60.3 million for counterterrorism assistance measures in the region. This includes legal assistance and border control and transport security.

In summary, the 2005-06 Budget consolidates and builds on past initiatives to enhance national security. There were no unexpected measures in the Budget nor were there any glaring omissions.

The continued interest by the Government in national security plus the range of ideas and concepts being worked on in agencies at the moment indicate that the rate of new initiatives is unlikely to decline markedly in the next year or two.

4 Australia's offshore oil and gas facilities required to produce security plans
Amendments have been introduced into the Federal Parliament to require operators of Australia's offshore oil and gas facilities and major transport and supply contractors to write and follow security plans. The security plans will require a security risk assessment and preventative strategies to manage risk.

The changes are contained in the Maritime Transport Security Amendment Bill 2005.

The amendments build upon the existing provisions which exist in the Maritime Transport Security Act 2003 and were designed to enhance other maritime infrastructure like the movement of ships and port security. The offshore oil and gas industry will be required to have security plans approved by the Department of Transport and Regional Services and be operational by 30 September 2005.

Regulations for the Amendment Bill will be in place by early July 2005 which will provide the necessary level of details for offshore industry participants to comply with the Act.

The Amendment Bill provides the mechanism for offshore industry participants to identify and address security risks. By identifying risks, industry participants will minimise the opportunities for acts of unlawful interference resulting from unauthorised persons gaining direct access to a facility or cargo going to a facility being tampered with. The offshore security plan will also provide the necessary response mechanisms in the event of a terrorist incident.

5 Details of the maritime industry identification card released
Amendments have been introduced in the Federal Parliament to amend the Maritime Transport Security Act 2003. The amendments will introduce a nationally recognised form of maritime industry identification which distinguishes the holder as having met the minimum background checking requirements.

The new arrangements will cover unmonitored personnel who are required to be in Maritime Security Zones. Some of the personnel covered by the Maritime Security Identification Card (MSIC) will be seafarers, stevedores, transport operators, port and offshore oil and gas facility workers. Foreign nationals who work within these zones will also be required to submit to background checking requirements for an MSIC. Maritime industry participants will need to submit an MSIC Plan or advise the Department of their preferred issuing body before background checking can commence. It is anticipated the MSIC Scheme will commence on 1 October 2005. From 1 July 2006 all personnel requiring unmonitored access to a Maritime Security Zones will be required to display an MSIC.

Below are details of the new Maritime Security Measures.

Overview: The MSIC is a nationally recognised form of maritime industry identification that distinguishes the holder as having met the security requirements. While the MSIC will have a standard appearance to facilitate easy recognition, it will also be sufficiently flexible to provide the option for Maritime Industry Participants (MIPs) to incorporate their access control features on the reverse side of the card. The Government will not be regulating any access control features incorporated onto the MSIC. Before incorporating any access features onto the MSIC, MIPs may need to consider compatibility issues with the Card's substrate.

Unmonitored and monitored - Persons who are required to be in a Maritime Security Zone but who do not have an MSIC, will need to be escorted or continuously monitored by an MSIC holder. Access arrangements into Maritime Security Zones are the responsibility of MIPs and are in accordance with individual MIPs' approved security measures in their Maritime or Offshore Security Plans.

Maritime Security Zones - Maritime Security Zones are defined in Part 6 of the Maritime Transport Security Act 2003 and includes security zones in regulated ports, around and on board regulated Australian ships and for offshore oil and gas facilities. Definition for offshore security zones will be in the Maritime Transport Security Amendment Bill 2005.

Issuing Bodies: A MIP with a Maritime or Offshore Security Plan can apply to be an MSIC issuing body or it may nominate another organisation to issue MSICs to its employees. Other organisations may also apply to be an MSIC issuing body. The Office of Transport Security (OTS) aims to keep the number of issuing bodies to a minimum.

Role of Issuing Bodies: Issuing bodies are responsible for
(i) establishing a MSIC applicant's identity based on the 100-point methodology
(ii) verifying that there is a legitimate need for the MSIC
(iii) providing a conduit for the consent to conduct background checks between the applicant and AFP, ASIO and DIMIA
(iv) manufacturing and issuing valid MSICs to successful applicants.
During the implementation period, the determination for citizenship checks will be made by issuing bodies.

Background Checks: The MSIC scheme will require the prospective holder to submit to a check of their background. These background checks will comprise a criminal history check undertaken by the Australian Federal Police (AFP), a security assessment by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and where an applicant is not an Australian Citizen or cannot establish lawful non-citizenship, a check will be undertaken by the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA). OTS has developed a specific list of offences which will form the basis of the MSIC criminal history checks. The list of offences is a result of consultation with experts in the field and international practice. Under the framework, an MSIC will be valid for five years unless there is a greater than 12 month absence from the regulated Australian maritime environment or if an issuing body considers that an individual requires new background checks to mitigate a risk. Further, if the holder is a foreign national, their MSIC will not be issued beyond the validity period of their visa.

Implementation Schedule: Legislative changes are required to facilitate the introduction of the MSIC scheme. The Maritime Transport Security Amendment Bill 2005 has been granted T-Status in the 2005 Parliamentary sittings. The draft Bill has been exposed to the MSIC Working Group. Following successful passage through Parliament, the draft regulations will also be exposed for consultation and it is anticipated that MSIC regulations will be presented to the Executive Council for approval in mid July. It is proposed that background checking for the MSIC will be introduced from 1 October 2005. Owing to an estimated 130,000 card bearers for the scheme, the rollout is anticipated to span nine months to 30 June 2006.

Role of Australian Government: During the implementation period, the Australian Government will determine if a maritime employee is eligible for an MSIC on the basis of criminal history checks and security assessments. The Australian Government will inform the issuing body of this eligibility. MSIC applicant(s) will also be advised separately of the outcome of background checks and if unsuccessful, the basis for that determination and information regarding appeal rights. The Australian Government will undertake a review of its role and responsibilities for future MSIC re-issue in 2006.

Cost Recovery: The cost of background checks will be recovered from the maritime industry. As at February 2005, these checks amount to $49 for each application. In addition to the background checking costs, issuing bodies may recover reasonable administrative costs associated with producing and issuing MSICs.

A detailed FAQ at http://www.dotars.gov.au/transsec/maritime/msic/index.aspx

6 New Review of Aviation Security in Australia
The Federal Parliament's Public Accounts and Audit Committees is to conduct a new inquiry reviewing aviation security in Australia, as a means to update progress since its last report into the subject, which was tabled in Parliament in June 2004. The terms of reference are to:

  1. regulation of aviation security by the Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services, and the Department's response to aviation security incidents since June 2004
  2. compliance with Commonwealth security requirements by airport operators at major and regional airports
  3. compliance with Commonwealth security requirements by airlines
  4. the impact of overseas security requirements on Australian aviation security
  5. cost imposts of security upgrades, particularly for regional airports
  6. privacy implications of greater security measures
  7. opportunities to enhance security measures presented by current and emerging technologies, including measures to combat identity fraud

The June 2004 report is available from here.

7 New Centre of Expertise established in Defence Autonomous Vehicle Systems
The Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) and the University of Sydney's Australian Centre for Field Robotics (ACFR) have just signed an agreement to form the new Centre of Expertise (COE) in Defence Autonomous and Uninhabited Vehicle Systems.

The new COE will focus on the development and application of Uninhabited Vehicle Systems for defence applications. This COE will extend collaborative research and development in autonomous and uninhabited systems for defence and will exploit leading edge technologies to address strategic challenges such as the aging population, the war on terror, reducing the cost of operations and force transformation.

The collaborative effort will enable a broad range of projects to be undertaken with a primary focus on multi-vehicle systems and the integration of uninhabited air, ground, and underwater vehicle systems. Four broad tasks have been agreed under the terms of the agreement:

  1. program to establish an Uninhabited Ground Vehicle (UGV) experimentation infrastructure within DSTO.
  2. development of a science and technology 'roadmap' for UGVs to help the Australian Defence Organisation identify critical systems requirements, major technology areas, and main drivers for Australian Defence Force UGVs
  3. specialist training and research opportunities for DSTO and ACFR, particularly in estimation and data fusion, autonomous navigation, sensors for autonomous navigation, and systems engineering
  4. investigation of the military application of autonomous underwater vehicles (UUVs), particularly teams of UUVs equipped with advanced acoustic sensors and communications in mine clearing applications

Note: The Commonwealth's Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources runs the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Development Project. Information it is available at www.industry.gov.au/uav

8 Major investment in special forces capability
Australia's Special Forces will benefit from a major investment in new leading edge capability and technology with the announcement of Project Redfin. Redfin has a budget of between $350 million and $450 million and aims to provide new capabilities to give the Special Forces a technology edge over emerging threats.

Discussions are underway to identify the Project's capability requirements that will be considered by Cabinet this year. The Project involves investigating a number of technology options covering the wide range of Special Forces roles, including special reconnaissance, offensive operations, special recovery, support operations, counter terrorism and response to chemical, biological and radiation incidents. The funding will cover the replacement of some existing capabilities and systems, additional combat equipment, communications, new special operations vehicles and improved air and maritime mobility capabilities.

The Defence Minister said the new capabilities that will be purchased are expected to be announced next year with the new equipment expected to enter service from 2007.

The project was announced by the Defence Minister while unveiling Defence's latest combat device to be issued to soldiers in Iraq - a device that allows soldiers to shoot around corners. The new viewing device will be attached on top of the Steyr to allow soldiers to look through the device to detect and engage targets from a position of cover.

The new device, developed by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) in South Australia and produced by BAE Systems, is part of the Howard Government's election commitment to improve the fighting capability and safety of the Army's regular infantry battalions in combat operations.

 

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